Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Ernest K. Gleed and Louise L. Baugh v. Penny L.
Mackey : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nathan Hult; Attorney for Defendant.
Philip C. Patterson; Patterson Barking & Sensenig; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Gleed and Baugh v. Baugh, No. 940257 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5937

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH C01
UTAH
DOCUMENT
K FU
£>
.' 0
LwCKET NO.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ERNEST K. GLEED,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,
and

*
*
*
*
*
*

-AiS

qw?7-

Appellant's Reply Brief to
Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant
Appellate Court No. 940257-CA

LOUISE L. BAUGH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 15

PENNY L. MACKEY,
Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

*
*
*
*

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, JUDGE, PRESIDING

NATHAN HULT [4704]
110 North 100 East
P.O. Box 543
Logan, Utah 84323-0543
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/
Cross-Appellee

PHILIP C. PATTERSON [2540]
PATTERSON, BARKING, & SENSENIG
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees/
Cro s s-Appe11ant

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

HOV 0 1 tVh

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ERNEST K. GLEED,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

•

*
*
*
*

and

Appellant's Reply Brief to
Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant
Appellate Court No. 940257-CA

*

LOUISE L. BAUGH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
*

vs.

Priority No. 15

PENNY L. MACKEY,
Defendant , Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, JUDGE, PRESIDING

NATHAN HULT [4704]
110 North 100 East
P.O. Box 543
Logan, Utah 84323-0543
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/
Cross-Appellee

PHILIP C. PATTERSON [2540]
PATTERSON, BARKING, & SENSENIG
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees/
Cross-Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities

iii

Statutes Cited

iii

Introduction

1

Relevant Statutory Provisions

1

Reply to Gleed's Arguments

2

I.
BOTH FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE AT ISSUE
ON APPEAL, CONTRARY TO GLEED'S CLAIM THAT
ONLY FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE AT ISSUE

2

II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A LIFE ESTATE MIGHT
BE RETAINED WHILE CONVEYING A VESTED
REMAINDER INTEREST CAN BE RAISED ON APPEAL,
CONTRARY TO GLEED'S ASSERTION

7

III. GLEED ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMS "THE FACT
PATTERN AND LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE
MARCH 1992 QUIT-CLAIM DEED DID NOT COMPEL THE
TRIAL COURT TO EXTEND ITS CONSIDERATION TO
THE FEBRUARY 14, 1990 DEED IN ORDER TO FULLY
ADJUDICATE THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY GLEED IN THIS
ACTION" (BRIEF OF APPELLEE AT 15)
Conclusion

10

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc, v.
Bonneville Inv., Inc,, 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990) • . . .

2

Doelle v, Bradley,
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989)

4

Hartman v. Potter,
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979)

3#4

Hatch v, Bastian,
567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977)

6

State v, Larsen,
865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)

3

State v. Olsen,
860 P.2d 332 (Utah 1993)

7

State v. Whittle,
780 P.2d 819 (Utah 1989)

7

Terry v. Price Mun. Corp.,
784 P.2d 146 (Utah 1989)

2

United Park City Mines Co. v.
Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993). . . .

2

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Unannotated, §57-1-3

3

Utah Code Unannotated, § 57-1-13

iii

lf3

INTRODUCTION
Following is the reply of Appellant Penny Mackey ("Mackey")
to the arguments made by Appellee Ernest Gleed ("Gleed") in his
brief ("Brief of Appellee") to this Court.

Mackey submitted her

brief ("Brief of Appellant") to this Court on July 14, 1994. The
issues on appeal in this case relate to: 1) A 1990 warranty deed
by which Louise Baugh ("Baugh") conveyed to herself and her son
Gleed a joint tenancy interest in two adjacent homes she owned in
Clearfield, Utah; and 2) A 1992 quitclaim deed by which Baugh
conveyed her remaining interest in the two homes (the "Rental
Home" and the "Baugh Home") to her granddaughter Mackey, thereby
severing the joint tenancy with Gleed and making Gleed and Mackey
tenants in common.

Baugh is now deceased.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are two relevant statutory provions on this appeal.
CODE UNANN.

UTAH

§ 57-1-13 states:

Conveyances of land may also be substantially in the
following form:
QUITCLAIM DEED
(here insert name), grantor, of
(insert
place of residence), hereby quitclaims to
(insert
name), grantee, of
(here insert place of
residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following
described tract
of land in
County, Utah, to
wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of said grantor this
day of _
, 19_ .
Such deed when executed as required by law shall
1

have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title,
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the
premises therein described and all rights, priveleges
and appurtances thereunto belonging, at the date of
such conveyance.
The second relevant provision is UTAH CODE UNANN. § 57-1-3 (1993),
which was quoted in the previously submitted Brief of Appellant.

REPLY TO GLEED'S ARGUMENTS
I.
BOTH FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE
TRIAL COURT ARE AT ISSUE ON APPEAL, CONTRARY TO GLEED'S
CLAIM THAT ONLY FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE AT ISSUE
Gleed incorrectly asserts (Brief of Appellee at 19) that
review of the validity of the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed is
purely a review of the trial court's findings of fact, when there
are actually both factual and legal conclusions that should be
reviewed.

Findings of fact should be reviewed under the "clearly

erroneous" standard, as Gleed points out.
of law are reviewed for correctness.

However, conclusions

See, e.g., Davidson Lumber

Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv.f Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990).

A.

Conclusions of Law
An appellate court pays no deference to a trial court's

conclusions of law.

See, e.g., United Park City Mines Co. v.

Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).

"In the

absence of ambiguity, construction of a deed is a question of
law, and this court is not bound by the trial court's
determination."

Terry v. Price Mun. Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149
2

(Utah 1989).

Additionally, when a trial court interprets a

statute, an appellate court is to pay no deference to the trial
court's interpretation.

See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d

1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).
It is difficult to imagine a deed being less ambiguous than
the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed wherein Baugh conveyed her
interest in the two properties to Mackey (see Brief of Appellant
at Addendum 1).

It unambiguously states that Louise Baugh hereby

quitclaims her interest in the two properties and conveys them to
Penny Mackey.

Therefore, the construction of this deed should be

reviewed as a matter of law, and the correctness of the trial
court's ruling that the deed was invalid should be determined.
Moreover, the Utah Legislature has prescribed a form for
quitclaim deeds and has stated, n[s]uch deed when executed as
required by law shall have the effect of a conveyance of all
right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the
premises therein described and all rights, privileges and
appurtances thereunto belonging at the date of such conveyance."
UTAH CODE UNANN.

§ 57-1-13. The quitclaim deed from Baugh to

Mackey complies with this statutorily prescribed form and
therefore its validity and effect should be construed as a matter
of law.

Additionally, as pointed out in the Brief of Appellant

at 9, a fee simple title is presumed to pass by a conveyance of
real estate unless "it appears from the conveyance that a lesser
estate was intended."

UTAH CODE UNANN.

§ 57-1-3 (emphasis added).

That is, "the term 'intention,' as applied to the construction of
3

a deed, is to be distinguished from its usual connotation • . . .
[W]hen so applied it is a term of art and signifies the meaning
of the writing."

Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah

1979) .
While the trial court did not explicitly interpret these
sections of the Utah Code, they certainly apply to this matter,
and this Court is in as good a position to rule on the force of
statutory provisions relative to the March 23, 1992 quitclaim
deed as the trial court would have been.

Moreover, by its

silence the trial court interpreted these statutory provisions as
not controlling the validity of the March 23, 1992 quitclaim
deed.

The policy question this silence presents to this Court is

this:

to what degree should trial courts be permitted to seek

evidence of a grantor's intent outside of a deed when it has not
explicitly determined that statutory commands protecting the
sanctity of unambiguous deeds are not controlling.

This question

is purely a question of law and is appropriately before this
Court.

Therefore, review of the validity of the March 23, 1992

quitclaim deed is primarily a question of law and this Court need
not show any deference to the trial court's conclusions.
B.

Findings of Fact
Gleed correctly points out that a party challenging findings

of fact must first marshall all of the evidence in support of the
trial court's finding, and then point out why the trial court's
finding is clearly erroneous.
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989).

See, e.g., Doelle v. Bradley, 784

Mackey has met that burden, contrary to
4

d e e d ' s claim.
1.

Marshalling the Evidence

The Statement of Facts (Brief of Appellant at 4) provides a
concise but thorough summary of the case.

It—unlike the Brief

of Appellee—focuses on the proceedings surrounding the actual
execution of the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed, the form of the
deed, and Baugh's intent when she actually executed the quitclaim
deed.

The reason for that focus is because a crucial question is

whether Baugh had a present intent to convey her property when
she executed the quitclaim deed.

Information showing that Baugh

later changed her mind (see Brief of Appellee at 22) does not
relate to whether Baugh presently conveyed her property interests
on March 23, 1992. Additionally, Mackey provided this Court with
verbatim copies of the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, as well as its August 25, 1993 bench ruling
(Brief of Appellant Addenda 3 and 4).

These certainly summarize

all of the evidence presented at trial, and present it in a light
favorable to the trial court because they are in the trial
court's own words.
2.

Clearly Erroneous Findings

Based on the marshalled evidence, there is a clearly
erroneous finding due to inconsistency.

On the one hand the

trial court ruled that Baugh intended to retain her entire
ownership interest in the Baugh Home and to leave undisturbed her
joint tenancy interest with Gleed in the Rental Home, giving
Mackey no valid property interest at all (Findings of Fact 21(a)
5

and 21(b)—see Brief of Appellant Addendum 4). But on the other
hand Baugh sought to place negotiating pressure on Gleed in hopes
of causing reciprocal conveyances between Mackey and Gleed of
their interests in the two properties (Finding of Fact 21(c)).
In essence the trial court ruled that Baugh sought to give Mackey
negotiating leverage over Gleed by giving Mackey nothing with
which to bargain.

This is a glaring inconsistency and is a clear

error, particularly as it relates to Conclusion of Law 14.
Finally, where reformation of a deed is at issue, an
appellate court can review both findings of fact and conclusions
of law since the court sits in equity.
P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Utah 1977).

Hatch v. Bastian, 567

And while appellate courts give

great deference to a trial court's findings of fact even when
sitting in equity, where the interests of justice require, review
of the evidence and independent findings of fact are appropriate.
Id.

Here, Gleed argues he should be the sole owner of two

houses, and Baugh's favorite granddaughter, Mackey, should have
nothing.

The trial court's ruling gives force to this

inequitable argument, so a close review of the trial court's
findings of fact is appropriate to ensure justice is served.
C.

Conclusion
This appeal presents substantial legal questions because the

1992 quitclaim deed was unambiguous and therefore can be
interpreted as a matter of law.

Additionally, statutory law is

implicated in this case and has significant ramifications as to
what degree a trial court should be permitted to seek evidence of
6

intent outside of an unambiguous and duly executed quitclaim
deed.

Therefore, this Court can review whether the trial court

correctly determined these issues. Additionally, Mackey
correctly marshalled the evidence relating to the trial court's
findings of fact, and pointed out how several of those findings
are so inconsistent as to be clearly erroneous.

Therefore, this

Court can also review those issues.

II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A LIFE ESTATE MIGHT BE
RETAINED WHILE CONVEYING A VESTED REMAINDER INTEREST
CAN BE RAISED ON APPEAL, CONTRARY TO GLEEDrS ASSERTION
Gleed asserts (Brief of Appellee at 16) that the issue of
whether Baugh retained an implied life estate while giving Mackey
a present and vested remainder interest when she executed the
March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed cannot be raised as an alternative
(see Brief of Appellant at 20) theory for upholding the validity
of the quitclaim deed.

However, an issue can be raised on appeal

if "plain error" was apparent in the trial court proceeding, and
if the plain error should have been obvious to the trial court
and substantially affects the rights of a party.

See State v.

Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d
819, 821 (Utah 1989) .
Mackey's counsel raised the issue of the need to uphold the
validity of the quitclaim deed in both her opening and closing
remarks (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 27 and Volume III at 271).
The need for a trial court to attempt to uphold the validity of a
deed is particularly apparent given the statutory commands
7

discussed above. Additionally, there was substantial testimony
indicating that: 1) Baugh wanted to remain in her house during
her lifetime (e.g., Trial Transcripts Volume I at 174-75); and 2)
Baugh wanted Mackey to "have" her house when she died (e.g.,
Trial Transcripts Volume III at 220, 238, 240). Furthermore, the
trial court found that Baugh sought to place negotiating pressure
on Gleed by executing the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed, yet when
executing the deed Baugh did not intend to convey any present
ownership interest to Mackey (Findings of Fact 21(a), 21(b), and
21(c)—see Brief of Appellant at Addendum 4 ) .
It is plain error for the trial court to in essence rule
that Baugh sought to give Mackey negotiating leverage with Gleed
by giving Mackey nothing with which to bargain, particularly in
the face of substantial testimony indicating that Baugh wanted
Mackey to "have" the Baugh Home on her death, but to continue
living in the Baugh Home during her lifetime.

Certainly a trial

court should consider the possibility that a life estate was
intended given these facts, particularly since the trial court
was sitting in equity and Mackey's counsel had stressed the need
to uphold the validity of the deed, which is in keeping with
legislative policy in

Utah.

To not consider this possibility

was plain error and should have been obvious to the trial court.
Additionally, this failure obviously affects Mackey's substantive
rights since its effect is to prevent her from assuming an
ownership interest in the two homes.

8

III. GLEED ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMS "THE FACT PATTERN AND
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE MARCH 1992 QUIT-CLAIM DEED
DID NOT COMPEL THE TRIAL COURT TO EXTEND ITS
CONSIDERATION TO THE FEBRUARY 14, 1990 DEED IN ORDER TO
FULLY ADJUDICATE THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY GLEED IN THIS
ACTION" (BRIEF OF APPELLEE AT 15)
The answer to this issue may depend on whether the trial
court had any basis to sit as a court in equity to reform the
1992 deed or whether, as a matter of law it was obligated to
uphold the validity of that deed.

The trial court concluded that

neither the 1990 deed nor the 1992 deed were obtained as a result
of fraud or undue influence, and therefore it should have upheld
both deeds as valid as a matter of law.
However, in looking behind the 1992 deed and finding that
Louise Baugh intended to retain ownership interest and not
transfer her ownership interest until the time of her death
(Finding 21(a)) the court felt that the testimony compelled that
the same intent "to have a life interest in the home" (Addendum
5, Appellant's Brief, p. 14, 1.17) applied to the 1990 deed as
well.

(Addendum 5, p. 14, 1. 13). Going on, the trial court

stated, referring to the Baugh home, "And I think clearly her
intent throughout this was that she maintain a life interest and
it be her home during her life.
it originally to Ernie.

(Emphasis added).

She conveyed

The intent was is [sic] that she have it

for a lifetime and upon death Ernie would have it. And when she
changed Ernie's name her intent at that time was to and I think
when she did it she intended to convey it - that she maintain a
life interest and she convey it to Penny after her death. And

9

both of these instances, based on the law, I think that that is
not a valid conveyance.

(Addendum 5, p.16, 1. 17 - p. 17, 1. 2).

Both the 1990 and 1992 deeds were admitted into evidence and
the judge found that Louise Baugh's intent with regard to both
deeds was the same as far as her home was concerned, that she
"maintain a life estate."

If the 1992 deed must fail because of

that intent, the same must logically and in fairness be applied
to the 1990 deed as to that particular home.

CONCLUSION
Determining the validity of the 1992 quitclaim deed is
primarily a question of law and therefore this Court owes no
deference to the trial court's determination.

Additionally, the

factual findings of the trial court regarding the 1992 quitclaim
deed can be reviewed by this Court because several of the
findings are clearly erroneous due to inconsistency.

Moreover,

this Court can also determine whether an implied life estate was
reserved for Baugh in the 1992 quitclaim deed while granting
Mackey a vested remainder interest because the trial court
committed plain error in not considering this possibility.
Finally, Gleed incorrectly asserts that the trial court could not
determine the validity of the 1990 warranty deed,

deed's

interests in the Baugh Home and Rental Home are dependant on
whether his interests derive from the 1990 warranty deed, or
merely as one surviving heir of Louise Baugh, and therefore the
trial court was correct to consider the validity of the 1990
10

warranty deed in adjudicating the relief sought by Gleed,
DATED this

day of October, 1994.
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